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Introduction 
Two recent cases from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal 
("B.C.C.A."), R v. Ferris1 and R v. 
Yamanaka, 2 have defined significant 
search authority relating to 
"investigative detention" and 
"articulable cause" that will decidedly 
impact police practices. The purpose 
of this article is to examine these 
cases and consider whether the 
pendulum is beginning to swing back 
to permit certain searches based on 
the operational realities confronting 
police officers. 
Background 
The Ferris case raised for the first 
time in the B.C.C.A. the issue of an 
"investigative detention" (also known 
as frisk search, pat down, stop and 
frisk or Terry Stop in the U.S.) and 
the existence or scope of the power 
of the police to search a person 
detained on the basis of "articulable 
cause." 
In Ferris, two police officers 
queried the licence plate of a vehicle 
they were following. The licence plate 
was stolen and when the emergency 
equipment was activated on the police 
vehicle the suspect vehicle did not 
stop. Eventually the suspect vehicle 
entered a parking lot, the driver bolted 
from the vehicle with one officer in 
pursuit and the other officer held the 
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two passengers in the vehicle at gun 
point and waited for backup. When 
assistance arrived, the officer ordered 
the passengers out of the vehicle. One 
of the passengers, Ms. Ferris, was 
advised by the officer that she was 
"under investigation for possession of 
stolen property", she was handcuffed 
behind her back and then subjected to 
a "pat down" search. Ms. Ferris 
provided a name when asked, and 
indicated her identification was inside 
the waist pack she was wearing. The 
officer removed the pack to look for 
identification and for "any weapons she 
may have had in the pouch." Aside from 
identification, the officer located two 
ounces of cocaine in the waist pack. 
The trial judge found the search 
constituted a breach of s. 8 (reasonable 
search and seizure) of the Charterand 
excluded the evidence. The B.C.C.A. 
was called upon to consider the validity 
of the search of the passenger's waist 
pack during an "investigative detention" 
under s.8. There are three requirements 
for a search to be constitutionally valid: 
( 1) it must be authorized by law; (2) 
the law itself must be reasonable; and 
(3) the manner of the search must be 
reasonable.3 Ryan J.A. (Newbury J.A. 
concurring) and Finch J.A. agreed, for 
slightly different reasons, that in certain 
circumstances, there is common law 
authority based on articulable cause to 
investigatively detain and search 
individuals. 
Authorized by Law 
As a preliminary point, Ryan J.A. 
noted that the difference between the 
Ferris case and the traditional search 
cases is that here: (1) the detention 
was intended to be brief; (2) the police 
were investigating a crime which was 
either in progress or had just occurred; 
and (3) the search was undertaken for 
purposes other than to discover 
contraband.4 
The Detention 
The first task for the Court was to 
determine whether the (a) 
(investigative) detention and (b) (frisk) 
search were authorized by law. Since 
there was no statutory (or incident to 
arrest) authority for the search the 
Court had to consider whether at 
common law there is a police power 
to "detain for investigation." Relying on 
the Ontario Court of Appeal ("O.C.A.") 
i:J. R v. Simpson, 5 which held that 
investigative detentions are lawful if 
based on articulable cause, all three 
B.C.C.A. justices agreed "there is a 
common law police power to detain a 
person in the course of a police 
investigation."6 The Simpson test for 
articulable cause is: 
... a constellation of objectively 
discernible facts which give the 
detaining officer reasonable cause 
to suspect that the detainee is 
criminally implicated in the activity 
under investigation ... A "hunch" 
based entirely on intuition gained 
by experience cannot suffice, no 
matter how accurate that "hunch" 
might prove to be.7 
However, Doherty J.A. in Simpson 
warned: 
I should not be taken as holding 
that the presence of articulable 
cause renders any detention for 
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investigative purposes a justifiable 
exercise of a police officer's 
common law powers. The inquiry 
into the existence of an articulable 
cause is only the first step in the 
determination of whether the 
detention was justified in the 
totality of the circumstances and 
consequently a lawful exercise of 
the officer's common law 
powers ... Without articu I able 
cause, no detention to investigate 
the detainee for possible criminal 
activity could be viewed as a 
proper exercise of the common law 
power.8 
Ryan J .A.agreed with the above 
test but cautioned that "We are dealing 
here with on-the-street observations by 
police officers who must act quickly" 
and in such cases, "the 
reasonableness of the officer's 
decision to stop a person whom the 
officer suspects is committing or has 
just committed a crime does not turn 
on the availability of less intrusive 
investigatory techniques [because] 
[s]uch a rule would unduly hamper the 
ability of the of the police to make swift, 
on-the-spot decisions."9 
In the Ferris case, the accused was 
the passenger in a moving vehicle that 
displayed stolen plates and in all the 
circumstances it was reasonable for 
the police officers to "suspect" that the 
occupants of the vehicle might be 
engaged in some form of criminal 
activity. As such, Ryan J.A. concluded 
that it was "beyond dispute that the 
police had articulable grounds to detain 
the passengers to determine what, if 
any, criminal activity was taking 
place."10 On the facts, however, the 
authors also believe that "reasonable 
grounds" existed that the accused had 
committed a criminal offence and she 
could have been arrested and searched 
as an incident of arrest, thereby 
avoiding the entire issue of investigative 
detention and articulable cause. 
The Search 
Since the investigative detention 
was authorized/justified, the second 
matter to be determined was whether 
the search was justified. In other 
words, is there a common law authority 
to search incident to investigative 
detention based on articulable cause? 
In considering the concept of"stop and 
frisk", Ryan J.A. relied on the United 
States Supreme Court ("U.S.S.C.") 
decision in Terry v. Ohio. 11 As Ryan 
J.A. noted, the majority in Terry 
"acknowledged the legitimate 
government interest in effective crime 
prevention and detection [and] ... 
confirmed that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct that leads 
the officer reasonably to conclude in 
light of his or her experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot, the 
police officer may approach and briefly 
detain the suspect to make reasonable 
inquiries aimed at confirming or 
dispelling the officer's suspicions."12 In 
addition to the state interest in 
investigating crime, there is also the 
more pressing interest of protecting 
police officers who are investigating 
crime. As noted by the majority in 
Teny. 
The crux of this case, however, is 
not the propriety of [the police 
officer's] taking steps to investigate 
petitioner's suspicious behaviour, 
but rather, whether there was 
justification for [the police officer's] 
invasion ofTerry's personal security 
by searching him for weapons in 
the course of that investigation. We 
are now concerned with more than 
the governmental interest in 
investigating crime; in addition, 
there is the more immediate 
interest of the police officer in 
taking steps to assure himself that 
the person with whom he is dealing 
is not armed with a weapon that 
could unexpectedly and fatally be 
used against him. Certainly it 
would be unreasonable to require 
that police officers take 
unnecessary risks in the 
performance of their duties .... [W]e 
cannot blind ourselves to the need 
for law enforcement officers to 
protect themselves and other 
prospective victims of violence in 
situations where they may lack 
probable cause for an arrest.13 
In approving the stop and frisk 
procedure for articulable cause, the 
majority in Terry distinguished 
searches incident to arrest as follows: 
An arrest is a wholly different kind 
of intrusion upon individual freedom 
from a limited search for weapons, 
and the interests each is designed 
to serve are likewise quite different. 
An arrest is the initial stage of a 
criminal prosecution. It is intended 
to vindicate society's interest in 
having its laws obeyed, and it is 
inevitably accompanied by future 
interference with the individual's 
freedom of movement, whether or 
not trial or conviction ultimately 
follows . The protective search for 
weapons, on the other hand, 
constitutes a brief, though far from 
inconsiderable, intrusion upon the 
sanctity of the person. It does not 
follow that because an officer may 
lawfully arrest a person only when 
he is apprised of facts sufficient to 
warrant a belief that the person has 
committed or is committing a 
crime, the officer is equally 
unjustified, absent that kind of 
evidence, in making any intrusions 
short of an arrest. Moreover, a 
perfectly reasonable apprehension 
of danger may arise long before the 
officer is possessed of adequate 
information to justify taking a 
person into custody for the purpose 
of prosecuting him for a crime.14 
In a powerful statement, Ryan J.A., 
after adopting the reasoning in Terry, 
stated: 
If the police have the duty to 
determine whether a person is 
engaged in crime or is about to be 
engaged in crime they should not 
be obliged to risk bodily harm to 
do so. It is my view that the police 
are entitled, if they are justified in 
believing that the person stopped 
is carrying a weapon, to search for 
weapons as an incident to 
detention. The question for the 
court must be whether the search 
was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first 
place. I have concluded that in 
proper circumstance the police are 
entitled to search for weapons as 
an incident to an investigative stop. 
The seriousness of the 
circumstances which led to the 
stop will govern the decision 
whether to search at all, and if so, 
the scope of the search that is 
undertaken ... Questioning an 
elderly shopper about a suspected 
shoplifting would not ordinarily 
require a search for weapons; 
questioning someone after a bank 
robbery might require a search of 
the detainee and his or her 
immediate surroundings.15 
Scope of the Search 
In considering the scope of the 
search, Ryan J.A. held: 
The police were conducting a 
spontaneous as opposed to a 
planned investigation. Given those 
circumstances it would be 
unreasonable to require them to 
determine with precision the least 
intrusive manner of securing their 
safety in the initial stages of their 
investigation. As well, at some 
point soon the detention would 
come to an end and the pack 
would be returned. The officers 
were entitled to ensure that when 
this was done they would not be 
placing themselves in danger by 
handling the respondent a 
concealed weapon. 
Finch J.A. noted that in 
determining whether the search for 
weapons was reasonably necessary, 
"the police perception of reasonable 
necessity depends very much on the 
particular circumstances in which the 
police officer finds himself."16 In this 
case, the trial judge found that 
because the accused was handcuffed 
behind her back, the waist pack was 
on the roof of the car and other officers 
were present, there was no police or 
public safety issue. However, Finch 
J.A. commented that "[c]ommon 
sense dictates that a prudent police 
officer engaged in an investigative 
detention will take care to protect 
himself and others from harm from the 
beginning of that detention to its 
termination."17 Thus, searching the 
pouch before it was returned was 
reasonable, although the officer did not 
directly testify on this point. 
Reasonableness of Law and 
Conduct of the Search 
In relation to the remaining two 
elements for a valid search under s. 8 
of the Charter, Ryan J .A observed that 
having found that an investigative 
detention and a search incidental to 
that investigation meets the test of 
reasonable necessity, it cannot be said 
that the common law power is 
unreasonable. Further, the scope and 
manner of the search in this case was 
not unreasonable.18 
Further Application 
More recently, in Yamanaka, supra, 
McEachern C.J.A. (Cumming and 
Finch J .A concurring) approved and 
applied the principle of investigative 
detention based on articulable cause. 
In Yamanaka, two police officers 
responded to several 911 complaints 
of gunfire at 5:30 a.m. one morning. 
The first officer arrived in the area and 
spoke with two individuals standing 
beside an older model vehicle. They 
stated their vehicle had broken down 
and backfired several times. A second 
officer arrived and observed drywalling 
equipment in the vehicle and found the 
backfire explanation suspicious. The 
second officer noted that the accused 
was holding an athletic bag very 
closely. The accused stated he was 
an electrician and there were electrical 
tools in the bag (which did not fit with 
the kind of tools in the vehicle). 
Concerned about weapons, the officer 
asked to search the bag. The officer 
found break-in instruments. The officer 
also testified that the individuals did not 
appear to belong in the neighbourhood. 
The Court found: 
In this case, the justification for a 
lawful search is stronger than it was 
in Ferris because the officer's 
knowledge of complaints of 
gunshots in the vicinity where the 
appellant was found was good 
reason to be concerned about his 
own safety .... These facts ... 
constituted articulable cause 
temporarily to detain the appellant 
for the purposes of investigating the 
complaints that had been received 
and to search the appellant for 
3 
weapons in the course of that 
investigation.19 
Conclusion 
The foregoing cases may have 
reversed the pendulum restricting police 
powers to search in appropriate 
situations. The concepts of articulable 
cause and investigative detention import 
significant principles from the United 
States jurisprudence where it has 
assisted police in their efforts to protect 
themselves and the public. 
However, the decisions dealing with 
articulable cause tend to use imprecise 
and contradictory terminology. As 
p1evills¥nJle:ll:~{flJ~o there is some 
ambiguity over exactly what threshold 
is required to form articulable cause. 
While it appears a "hunch" is insufficient 
and "reasonable grounds" are not 
necessary to form articulable cause, 
"reasonable suspicion" (Doherty J.A.), 
a reasonable conclusion (U.S.S.C.), or 
"suspecting" (Ryan J.A.) that a person 
may be involved in criminal activity have 
been found to be sufficient. Officers 
must be able to articulate, based on 
the "totality of the circumstances," the 
facts and reasons they relied upon to 
formulate the need for an investigative 
detention and/or search. It is clear that 
police officers must receive instruction 
regarding the application of these 
principles. More importantly, where 
reasonable grounds exist to effect an 
arrest, it is our view that the search 
incident to arrest authority will always 
provide a more secure foundation upon 
which to conduct business. 
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Labour Relations In The RCMP 
Introduction 
1998 signals the 125t11 anniversary 
of the RCMP. Historically, the RCMP 
has been a rigid paramilitary force, and 
as such, little thought was given to con-
cepts like participatory management 
with the rank-and-file.1 In particular, for 
more than 100 years, there was no 
collective system in place to address 
the concerns of the rank-and-file. In 
fact, in 1918 an Order-in-Council was 
signed prohibiting members of the 
RCMP, under pain of dismissal, from 
forming or becoming a member of any 
organization to deal with employment 
issues. That Order was only rescinded 
in 197 4, after the eruption of unrest 
within the rank-and-file over pay and 
working conditions. 
In the face of embarrassing stories 
like the 1972 Maclean's article by Jack 
Ramsey,2 a blistering indictment of 
RCMP management, and the boiling 
over of rank-and-file dissention in large 
urban centres, Commissioner Nadon 
was forced to try and address labour 
and management issues. The result 
4 
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was that RCMP members, without a 
vote, had foisted upon them an inter-
nally organized, funded and manage-
ment-controlled employee "representa-
tion" system to address their con-
cerns. 3 This Division Staff Relations 
Representative Program ("DSRRP") 
was then, and still is, hailed by man-
agement and the government as an 
"effective" tool to address employee 
concerns. The mandate of the DSRRP 
is contained within the Commissioner's 
Standing Orders ("CSOs"), which are 
enacted by the Commissioner's office.4 
RCMP members are not free to bar-
gain with their employer, the federal 
Treasury Board. Any communication 
with Treasury Board relating to pay and 
benefits for members is done through 
the Commissioner. 
For many, the illegitimacy of this 
framework was highlighted recently 
when the Commissioner, who is pur-
portedly negotiating pay matters in the 
best interests of members, received a 
17% pay raise (i.e. over $20,000.00) 
and other bonuses before the issue of 
pay (which had been frozen for several 
years) for the rank-and-file was set-
tB::l: Despite the actual or perceived 
conflicts of interest that exist in such 
a situation, this process is still upheld 
by the Commissioner and the federal 
government as a viable and legitimate 
way of conducting business on behalf 
of members. Without collective bar-
gaining and independent binding third-
party review, the Commissioner es-
sentially has unfettered control over 
the members of the RCMP with re-
gard to grievances and discipline, and 
he is inappropriately responsible for 
asserting pay and benefits before the 
Treasury Board on behalf of the rank-
and-file. 
The purpose of this article is two-
fold. First, I will provide some exam-
ples of why the current RCMP labour 
relations regime can no longer be sup-
ported. Second, I will outline the ap-
peal of S/Sgt. Delisle to the Supreme 
Court of Canada to have the various 
legislative provisions that currently 
prohibit RCMP members from form-
ing an association struck down as un-
constitutional. 
The Past and Present 
There is considerable evidence that 
the current RCMP labour relations re-
gime can no longer be sustained. In 
1974, as result of widespread labour 
unrest within the RCMP, the Marin Com-
mission was appointed to review mat-
ters relating to the public complaints 
process, grievances and internal disci-
pline in the RCMP.6 Among other 
things, the Marin Commission deter-
mined that the RCMP discipline and 
management system was basically 
punitive in nature, and was subject to 
considerable formal and informal abuse 
by commissioned officers. The Marin 
Commission recommended a remedial 
discipline process, and to some de-
gree, their recommendations in that 
regard have been implemented. The 
Marin Commission also pointed out the 
apparent conflict that exists when the 
RCMP Commissioner represents mem-
bers before Treasury Board on pay and 
benefit issues.7 
Approximately ten years later, when 
some of the recommendations of the 
Marin Commission were finally legis-
lated, two bodies were created to over-
see internal accountability matters: the 
Public Complaints Commission 
("PCC") and the External Review Com-
mittee ("ERC"). The ERC has limited 
authority to review certain types of 
grievances and discipline matters. It 
also has the mandate to make recom-
mendations to the Commissioner, but 
those recommendations are not bind-
ing. It is self-evident that any oversight 
body that can only make recommen-
dations, rather than binding decisions, 
leaves the final decision in the hands 
of the very management that made the 
decision in the first place. Recent data 
regarding ERC reviews suggests that 
in 27.5% of internal discipline cases 
the Commissioner has disagreed with 
and/or rejected the findings of the 
ERC.8 
A clear example of the limited au-
thority the ERC has over RCMP man-
agement is provided by the case of Cpl. 
''.4" v. Appropriate Officer "B". 9 Sec-
tion 40( 1) of the RCMP Act10 empow-
ers the Force to initiate internal Code 
of Conduct investigations. Section 
40(2) requires members to answer 
questions relating to the investiga-
tion, even though they may incrimi-
nate the member or subject the mem-
ber to a penalty (i.e. compelled, or-
dered, required or duty statements). 
However, s. 40(3) precludes the ad-
mission of answers in any criminal, 
civil or administrative proceeding. In 
Cpl. ·w: the member answered ques-
tions during an internal investigation. 
The member specifically objected to 
answering all but three questions 
posed by the investigator. At the in-
ternal Adjudication Board hearing, 
the RCMP attempted to enter into 
evidence the answers to the three 
questions Cpl. "A" did not object to 
answering. The issue was whether 
the answers were inadmissible be-
cause of subsection (3). 
A body of case law has developed 
over the years dealing with this is-
sue. For example, the decision of the 
ERC in Special Cst. ''.4 "clearly stated 
that: 
The member is not compelled in 
any way to object to answering 
to invoke the protection of the 
Act. Just as section 13 of the 
Charter, subsection 40(3) auto-
matically protects a person com-
pelled by law to make incrimi-
nating statements.11 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The internal Adjudication Board 
in the Cpl. ''.4" case properly ruled 
that "the answers to questions were 
automatically protected bys. 40(3), 
regardless of whether he objected or 
was ordered to answer."12 
The Adjudication Board's decision 
to exclude Cpl. "A's" answers was 
appealed to the ERC, which, after a 
detailed analysis, upheld the Board's 
decision. However, on further review 
by the RCMP Commissioner, the 
findings and recommendations of the 
ERC were rejected, as well as previ-
ous rulings of the Ontario Provincial 
Court in R. v. Radeschi, 13 the New 
Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench 
in Murphyv. Keating, 14 and the B.C. 
Court of Appeal in Gustar v. 
Wadden, 15 that directly or indirectly 
held that an objection/order is not re-
quired to obtain the protection of s. 
40 (i.e. the protection is automatic). 
Aside from the foregoing cases 
dealing with ordered statements, the 
Commissioner was also fully aware of 
a review undertaken by Rene J. Marin, 
on behalf of the RCMP, of s. 40 state-
ments.16 The Marin Report confirms that 
s. 40 statements should be automati-
cally protected. However, the Commis-
sioner's refusal to follow these authori-
ties unavoidably raises questions about 
leaving the final decision on internal mat-
ters in the hands of the Commissioner. 
Despite the fundamental importance 
of this case to all members, the 
DSRRs, who are internally "elected" to 
represent members, refused to finan-
cially assist Cpl. "A" with an applica-
tion for judicial review before the Fed-
eral Court.17 The case was ultimately 
settled through an Alternate Dispute 
Resolution process. The terms of the 
settlement are sealed, however, the 
Commissioner's decision remains un-
challenged. 
The Cpl. ''.4" case is not the only 
example where the protections offered 
by statute have apparently been ignored 
by senior executive of the RCMP. Mem-
bers in Quebec in the Gingras case18 
had to pursue a lengthy and costly le-
gal battle to get the Commissioner to 
pay a bilingual bonus to eligible mem-
bers, even though such bonuses were 
a mandated federal government pro-
gram. It is clear in the Gingras decision 
tr.at the Commissioner unilaterally ar-
bitrarily and without authority decided 
not to pay the bilingual bonus to eligi-
ble members. The RCMP has now had 
to retroactively pay millions of dollars in 
bilingual bonuses with interest. 
Even more interestingly, after the 
Gingras decision, senior executive of 
the RCMP proposed/supported dramatic 
changes to the existing pieces of legis-
lation governing the Force (without prior 
consultation with DSRRs), claiming that 
the Commissioner's authority was 
somehow fettered by the findings in 
Gingras. The government responded by 
introducing Bill C-5819 into the House 
of Commons in November of 1994. 
Among other things, this Bill proposed 
to remove RCMP members from the 
statutory protection for occupational 
health and safety provided by the 
Canada Labour Code ("CLC''). No ra-
tional explanation has ever been pro-
vided on how the issue of bilingual bo-
5 
nuses and occupational health and 
safety were connected under Gingras. 
In any event, the Commissioner "prom-
ised" members that he would provide 
in the form of policy and/or CSOs new 
occupational health and safety provi-
sions, "equal to or better" than those 
provided in the CLC. 20 However, this 
promise glosses over a significant 
point. The CLC empowers Labour 
Canada, a body independent from the 
RCMP, to make binding orders, review, 
investigate and lay charges in relation 
to occupational health and safety vio-
lations. In other words, the CLC pro-
vides an independent statutory regime 
for compliance, enforcement and pros-
ecution that is not operated by the em-
ployer/Commissioner. 
Fortunately, in response to Bill C-
58, neophyte regional RCMP Associa-
tions (non-profit organizations that are 
not part of the DSRRP), with the as-
sistance of the Canadian Police As-
sociation, successfully organized a se-
ries of responses that identified the 
apparent discontinuity between the 
Gingras case and the broad statutory 
amendments supported by RCMP ex-
ecutive. To date, it has never been proi:r 
erty explained how, according to the 
Commissioner, the Gingras case 
"muddied the waters." In fact, the 
Gingras case, after years of opposi-
tion by the RCMP, clarified that the 
Commissioner cannot act outside his 
authority or contrary to the law. For 
many, it is apparent that the senior 
executive of the RCMP, through Bill C-
58, engaged in a blatant attempt to 
consolidate authority in the Commis-
sioner's office, by removing, among 
other things, one more form of inde-
pendent, binding oversight of manage-
ment's actions. 
More recently, the method by which 
the RCMP's Alternate Dispute Reso-
lution system ("ADR") was developed 
and implemented undermined the cred-
ibility of the ERC. The new ADR l?YS-
tem was developed in response to a 
statutorily based internal grievance 
process that was burdened by bureau-
cratic obstacles, excessive time de-
lays (i.e. it can takes years to address 
even a minor grievance) and a lack of 
confidence crisis within the rank-and-
file. While the development of an ADR 
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system is commendable, the RCMP 
retained the services of a company led 
by the then acting Chair of the ERC to 
conduct the ADR project.21 It appar-
ently never occurred to anyone in the 
decision-making process that having a 
contract with the RCMP and holding a 
quasi-judicial position as the acting 
Chair of the ERC may create actual or 
perceived issues of bias for members. 
In addition, an RCMP association from 
Quebec requested an investigation of 
the Chair of the RCMP Pay Council (a 
recently formed and internally funded 
in-house body that makes recommen-
dations, which are not necessarily dis-
closed to members, to the Commis-
sioner on pay and benefits) on the ba-
sis of reliable information that the Chair 
"has officially taken sides against the 
formation of a union, and collective bar-
gaining rights within the RCMP ... "22 
Even more disturbing is a recent 
internal discipline case dealing with 
regulation 57 of the RCMP Regulations, 
which prohibits members of the force 
from holding public office or engaging 
in any political activity. S/Sgt. Delisle 
(a well known RCMP union activist), 
was subject to suspension without pay 
for a period of 1 .5 years for being 
elected the unpaid mayor of a village 
near Montreal, which is not policed by 
the RCMP. Delisle has also been a 
DSRR for the past 17 years. Prior to 
the election, he notified the Command-
ing Officer of Quebec that he was run-
ning for election, and was given per-
mission to run (at the same time, a 
Commissioned Officer held an elected 
position as a town councillor in a small 
town close to Ottawa, and more than 
one member in Alberta held an elected 
position23 ). 
Only days prior to the election, 
Delisle was ordered to withdraw as a 
candidate. He refused and was imme-
diately suspended. At the time of sus-
pension, Delisle attempted to file a 
grieveance. The Commanding Officer 
refused to accept the grievance, claim-
ing that it was not a grievable decision. 
The suspension of S/Sgt. Delisle with-
out pay was in blatant violation of 
RCMP policy and the Commissioner's 
publicly stated position on when a 
member will be suspended without pay; 
i.e. a) imprisonment, b) reprehensible 
conduct, c) reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe member has com-
mitted a criminal offence, d) absent 
without authority, and e) refused/failed 
to reportforduty.24 S/St. Delisle even-
tually appeared before the Arbitration 
Board of Human Resources Develop-
m enteanada f.e. unemployment in-
surance), which found that " ... the real 
motive for the suspension is more the 
fact that Mr. Delisle wanted to estab-
lish an RCMPolice officers assocation 
than the fact he was running for 
mayor."25 Delisle's only form of re-
dress was to engage in a Federal 
Court action. He has subsequently 
been reinstated, all backwages have 
been paid to him, and he continues 
with a civil lawsuit against the RCMP 
for $640,000.00 to cover his legal 
costs, as well as specified, general 
and punitive damages. 
In the last few weeks, regulation 
57 has been struck down by the Que-
bec Superior Court as excessive in its 
restrictions on members rights.26 This 
is not surprising since this same con-
clusion was reached more than a year 
ago by a parliamentary committee 
which specifically reviews regulations. 
Despite communicating the commit-
tee's findings to the Commissioner re-
garding regulation 57, the RCMP still 
considered it necessary to fight 
Delisle's case before the Quebec 
courts. 
Similarly disturbing is the occasion 
when S/Sgt. Delisle, as a DSRR, was 
expelled from DSRR caucus meetings 
because the other DSRRs disagreed 
with his position on unionization. S/ 
Sgt. Delisle ultimately obtained an 
interim injunction from the Federal 
Court.27 Unable to silence S/Sgt. 
Delisle, the response of the Commis-
sioner was to enact CSOs prohibiting 
DSRRs from engaging in "activities 
that promote alternate programs in 
conflict with the non-union status of 
the DSRRP."28 It was not long before 
two DSRRs from British Columbia filed 
a complaint against S/Sgt. Delisle af-
ter he attended the inaugral meeting 
of a British Columbia RCMP associa-
tion, alleging that he was supporting 
another form of employee representa-
tion contrary to the CSOs.29 Clearly, 
open communication, freedom of ex-
pression, opinion and association and 
other democratic principles are not 
deeply rooted in the DSRRP or the 
RCMP. 
It is apparent that even in the face 
of unambiguous jurisprudence, the 
Commissioner is often intransigent in 
recognizing the rights of RCMP mem-
bers in relation to internal matters. The 
apparently cavalier disregard for the in-
terests of members demonstrated by 
the Cpl. ''A"case, Gingras case (and 
its aftermath), the Delisle cases and 
the inherent limitations of the DSRRP 
and ERC process, amply demonstrate 
the precarious, inequitable and one-
sided nature of labour relations in the 
RCMP. 
The Road to Full Employee Rights 
Despite the fact that the current 
statutory framework governing the 
RCMP does not allow or expressly 
excludes RCMP members from form-
ing an employee association, several 
non-profit associations have been 
formed in an attempt to provide an al-
ternative means to deal with issues 
affecting RCMP members. There is no 
question that the current Liberal Gov-
ernment (and RCMP executive) are 
adamantly opposed to any notion of 
collective bargaining in the RCMP. This 
is so even in the face of the recent rec-
ommendations of the federal govern-
ment's own task force on labour issues 
that unionization be permitted in the 
RCMP.30 The Sims Task Force re-
ceived submissions from four regional 
RCMP associations, the Canadian 
Police Association and the Ontario 
Provincial Police Association and ob-
served that: 
Submissions [of the above-noted 
associations] ... requested that 
Part 1 of the Code cover the 
R.C.M.P. so that its members 
could engage in collective bargain-
ing. They did not seek the right to 
strike, accepting arbitration as the 
appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism .... Much of the 
R.C.M.P.'s modern-day activities 
consist of contract policing for 
eight provinces and approximately 
200 Municipalities. To a great ex-
tent, the duties and responsibili-
ties of the R.C.M .P. and their pro-
vincial counterparts are indistin-
guishable ... Members of a police 
force could be granted access to 
collective bargaining without de-
nying the need for operational con-
trol and without jeopardizing the 
public interest. 31 (Emphasis 
added) 
The government rejected any con-
sideration of such a move. As a re-
sult, it appears that members will once 
again have to take the judicial road to 
secure some leadership and binding 
external direction on internal matters. 
This trip had already been started. 
On November 28, 1989, the Quebec 
Superior Court rejected S/Sgt. 
Delisle's legal challenge that the pro-
visions preventing RCMP members 
from forming a union are invalid. The 
decision of the Superior Court was 
appealed by Delisle to the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, and that appeal was 
dismissed January 29, 1997. In a 
strong dissent, Baudouin J.A. ob-
served: 
Legislature has implemented, as 
a substitute [for collective bargain-
ing] a system of internal represen-
tation, which has no real power in 
actual practice, as management 
exercises absolute and unques-
tionable authority over the mem-
bers. The situation therefore rep-
resents a notable exception to the 
fundamental freedom universally 
recognized in all free and demo-
cratic societies to unionize and 
hence be able to negotiate one's 
working conditions without hin-
drance ..... Indeed, at the present 
time the only group structure that 
they may have [DSRRs] is the one 
imposed by law, a structure that 
is emptied of all effective power 
and, in the final analysis, wholly 
governed by management.32 
This case has been appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada and will 
be argued in the fall of 1998.33 
The factum filed on behalf of Delisle 
asserts four basic constitutional argu-
ments in support of striking down the 
provisions that deny members the right 
to collectively bargain. Delisle argues 
that his/members' Charter rights of 1) 
freedom of association, 2) freedom of 
expression, 3) right to equality have 
been breached, and 4) that the im-
pugned provisions are not reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as demonstra-
bly justified in a free and democratic 
society. 
First, Delisle argues that the im-
pugned legislative provisions deny him 
the fundamental right to form a union 
of his choosing and thus violates his 
very basic right to freedom of associa-
tion. 34 The argument surrounding free-
dom of association deals with Delisle's 
forced obligation to participate in an 
employer-dominated system (i.e. the 
DSSRP) which, aside from muzzling 
dissent, stifles his right to associate 
freely and institutionalizes the employ-
er's absolute dominance. In effect, the 
government has legislated an "unfair 
labour practice" by exempting itself 
from the laws which all other employ-
ers must comply with. The DSRRP and 
related statutory provisions prevent 
members from holding a free vote about 
whether they wish to participate in this 
system. 
Second, it is Delisle's submission 
that the impugned provisions deny him 
the fundamental right to express him-
self either a) by voting on whether or 
not he wants a union, b) through the 
actual formation of a union of his own 
choosing, or c) ultimately in express-
ing his solidarity with other members 
of the RCMP 35· Delisle submits that it 
is self-evident that ''the right to associ-
ate is essential to securing an effec-
tive employee voice, [and] the denial 
of that right has the effect of denying 
freedom of expression since access 
to that effective employee voice is re-
fused."36 
Third, Delisle argues that the im-
pugned legislative provisions deny his 
right to equality under s. 15 of the Char-
ter. 37 It is Delisle's submission that his 
status and obligations as police officer 
extend beyond the workplace, and in 
effect, have become a personal char-
acteristic. Further, RCMP members are 
isolated and insular, and based on past 
and current denials of fundamental 
rights by the RCMP (examples are 
detailed in the factum) they are a vul-
nerable group in need of protection.38 
Last, Delisle submits that the in-
fringement of his constitutional rights 
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is not justified under s. 1 of the Char-
terbecause 1) the objective of prevent-
ing a union in the RCMP does not re-
spond to any "pressing or substantial 
concern" in a democratic society; rather 
it perpetuates a power imbalance 
wherein the Commissioner has abso-
lute power and control over members' 
rights; 2) should the objective of pre-
venting a union in the RCMP respond 
to pressing concerns that the RCMP 
could become subject to an illegal work 
stoppage (an argument Delisle and 
every other police association does not 
concede), no "rational connection" has 
been demonstrated between the ab-
solute denial of the right to form a un-
ion, or even to express oneself on this 
point, and the requirement for uninter-
rupted law enforcement service; 3) a 
proper balance has not been struck 
between the rights of freedom of asso-
ciation and expression and the right 
to equality under the law and the ab-
solute prohibition to unionize and the 
absolute power of the RCMP Commis-
sioner; and 4) there is no "proportion-
ality'' between the deleterious effects 
of the prohition or absolute denial of 
the right to form a union and the ob-
jective of uninterrupted police serv-
ices. 39 
At bottom, the government/ 
RCMP's alleged basis for denying the 
right to form a union is the apprehen-
sion of the potential for a possible in-
terruption of police service in the event 
of a potential unresolved labour dispute 
and the perception of a potential con-
flict of loyalty. As Delisle notes, among 
other things, a) it has never been es-
tablished that such an occurrence is 
likely (rather the facts indicate the op-
posite), b) the evidence indicates that 
RCMP members are loyal and law 
abiding, c) the loyalty argument is 
based on the premise that RCMP 
members are unable to appreciate the 
difference between their rights as em-
ployees and their professional respon-
sibilities, which is "patronizing", "insult-
ing" and unsupported by evidence, d) 
numerous other emergency services 
occupations are permitted to unionize, 
e) the right to strike is not sought by 
RCMP members and/or other alterna-
tives exist to prevent interruption of 
services (e.g. arbitration), and f) pro-
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viding basic rights to members is more 
conducive to civil order and respect for 
the law than denying rights enjoyed 
by other employees. 
Conclusion 
Given the RCMP labour relations 
record provided in this paper, and the 
disposition of the Supreme Court of 
Canada with regard to basic constitu-
tional rights, there is every possibility 
that the legislative provisions at issue 
will be found unconstitutional. Should 
that happen, RCMP members will at 
least enjoy the right to choose whether 
or not they want to collectively bargain 
and have independent employee rep-
resentation. Even if the DSRRP initially 
survives, having the right to dispose of 
that program and adopt a new em-
ployee relations process whenever the 
members choose is a very powerful ve-
hicle to ensure management truly 
deals with employee issues on a level 
playing field. However, given the Com-
missioner's purported commitment to 
empowerment, consultation, and the 
RCMP's stated mission, vision and 
values, it should not require direction 
from a court to bring RCMP labour re-
lations into the 20th century, as it pre-
pares to exit for the new millennium. 
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